4: Hoffman E-4 (no date) 1967 MW11 Shluh MW11 (ca. 1900)

those defined by common residence in a nucleated or semi-nucleated community. A common approach to the problem is that illustrated by Montagne, who distinguished five units for the southern and central Shluh: the extended family, the minor lineage (*ikhs*), the *mouda* or "sous-fraction", the fraction or canton, and the tribe. The distinction between kinship unit and community unit is not made, however.

Les unités sociales les plus faciles à définir sont les plus petites et il est particulièrement aisé d'observer la vie du hameau, du village et de la sous-fraction dont l'activité se trouve limitée aux circonstances de l'existence quotidienne.

Dans toute la montagne des Masmouda, la plupart des habitants des vallées vivent groupés en petits hameaux de vingt à trente feux, construits sur les pentes ensoleillées ou sur un piton détaché ou une roche élevée, en un lieu propice à la défense. Chaque hameau, "tadchert", est habituellement peuplé de deux ou trois groupes familiaux, auxquels on donne le nom d' "Ikhs". Ce sont là, nous l'avons vu, de petites unités patriarcales et agnatiques formées par les fils et les petits-fils d'un même père, vivant plus ou moins dans l'indivision, augmentées souvent par des apports étrangers.

Il arrive d'ailleurs souvent que chaque "ikhs" occupe un groupe séparé de maisons. Le hameau prend parfois le nom d'un lieu-dit ou d'un accident topographique... Souvent, aussi, c'est le nom de la famille qui l'emporte sur celui du lieu habité...

Trois ou quatre hameaux rapprochés les uns des autres, ou un gros village, comme ceux qui existent parfois à la partie supérieure des oueds, au voisinage des riches pâturages des sommets, forment généralement une unité à laquelle on donne souvent dans cette région le nom de "mouda'", et que nous appelons dans notre terminologie administrative la sous-fraction. Une "mousquée du vendredi" où les étrangers de passage viennent demander l'hospitalité, un "agadir" ou magasin collectif, dans les régions où cette institution s'est conservée, et surtout l'existence d'une "jema'a", assemblée de tous les hommes en état de porter les armes, telles sont les institutions du "mouda'"... (Montagne, 1930, pp. 151-152).

Berque, speaking from his experiences among the Seksaoua (559) of the western High Atlas, presents a somewhat different analysis of a situation in which the *mouda* is perhaps somewhat variant.

La forme de l'habitat est celle du "hameau" *lmud'a* aux maisons soudées, opposant à la menace externe un périmètre sans fissure. L'agglomé-

4: Hoffman E-4 (no date) 1967 MW11 Shluh MW11 (ca. 1900)

C. FORMAL LOCAL INSTITUTIONS FOR SOCIAL ACTION AND CONTROL

1. *Berber Representative Councils*

Formal traditional tribal controls among the Berbers – Shluh, Beraber, Riffian, and Zenata alike – are based upon a system of superimposed representative councils. Most commonly these are designated by the term *jemaa*, a slight Berberization from the Arabic *ejjemaa*. Other terms, however, are also in use: such are *ait arbain* ("sons of the forty") – employed throughout the High Atlas, Middle Atlas, and the Rif, usually with reference to the council of a tribe or independent district; *diwan* – used by some of the Shluh to refer to the council of the district; *inflas* (pl. of *anflous*, "notable") – used by the Shluh of the Sous region and the Anti-Atlas; and *ayarau* (pl. *iyarawen*) – used in the Rif to refer to the tribal council (Coon, 1931, p. 96; Loubignac, 1942, p. 280; Montagne, 1930, pp. 220-222).

a. *Structure*

In theory, the *jemaa* of the minor lineage or village (the smallest groups to have councils) among most Berber groups (the *ksour* inhabitants excepted) are composed of the heads of each family or tent within the minor lineage or village, each of these family heads having a voice in the deliberations. In practice only the most "notable" of these (usually one per extended family) actually participate in council activities – the status of "notable" (*ikhatar*, pl. *ikhataren* in *Tamazight*) being achieved entirely on the basis of personal character, age, courage in combat, religious piety, acquired authority, or wealth. The *jemaa* therefore traditionally has the character of a gerontocracy; in this they are supported by the general attitude that the elders are the *ait l'ak'oul*, that is, the people of experience and judgment, and they should guide and command the young. Young married men, heads of families, may attend the council, but must remain content to listen to and approve the words of their elders (Doutté, 1905; Loubignac, 1942, p. 280; Montagne, 1930, pp. 220-224).

Some exceptions exist to this general rule. Thus Coon (1930, pp. 96-98) found that among some of the Riffians the village council (or

4: Hoffman E-4 (no date) 1967 MW11 Shluh MW11 (ca. 1900)

minor lineage council) was composed of two or three boys from each of the extended families claiming descent from the common founder of the minor lineage. These boys were chosen by the members of the comune council (the "council of the great"), supposedly by virtue of their superior intelligence and promise of future ability. These junior notables followed the general pattern governing council conduct – electing a *moqaddem* (pl. *moqaddemin*; "moderator"), meeting in the village mosque, and judging minor cases brought before them. Their elders saw to it that their decisions were enforced. Since Coon also found many cases in which village councils were absent, it seems reasonable to conclude that in this region, at least, the institution did not serve an important function.

Each of the social units existing above the minor lineage or village customarily has its own representative council composed of representatives or delegates from the inferior social unit (usually this is equivalent to a delegate from the council of the inferior unit). Thus the *jemaa* of the commune consists of representatives from each minor lineage council; the *jemaa* of the district may consist of representatives from each commune or village; and the *jemaa* of the tribe, of representatives from each district. In the Rif, however, the district council is absent (this is also the case, naturally, among those Beraber groups in which the district is not present), and the tribal council is composed of representatives from each commune or village (Coon, 1931, pp. 96-98; Loubignac, 1942, p. 280; Montagne, 1930, pp. 219-221).

Among the *ksar*-dwellers of southern Morocco the institution of the *jemaa* shows considerable modification. In Ksar Nesrat, for example, superimposed councils are absent – instead the tribal government is embodied in a single bicameral organization composed of a superior assembly (*Jemaa el Kebira*) and an inferior assembly (*Jemaa el 'amma*). The seats within the superior assembly are the property of the noble extended families within each of the seven division of the *ksar* (these divisions are probably morphologically equivalent to major lineages or communes – see Table III), and are filled by representatives selected by each of these noble families. Each division is therefore represented in proportion to the number of its noble families. Once designated, the councillors

4: Hoffman E-4 (no date) 1967 MW11 Shluh MW11 (ca. 1900)

hold office for life, except in case of grave error or commission. The two presidents, the *imgharin*, are chosen for life by the members of the superior council, and represent the *ksar* before outsiders (La Chapelle, 1929, p. 32).

The members of the inferior or peoples' council are chosen by the superior council from among the most violent and boisterous toughs in each division, for they are responsible for carrying out the decisions of the superior council and for policing the *ksar*, and the theory is that this work will be facilitated by the fear which they inspire. The president of the inferior council, the *amghar n l'amt*, is similarly selected by the members of the superior body, and acts as a police-chief for the *ksar* (La Chapelle, 1929, p. 33).

Such a bicameral organization apparently is common throughout the Lektawa region, with the common variation that the superior council has only one president, or *amghar*. To the east, in the Tiallalin region of the Oued Ziz, this political structure apparently becomes simplified further, for Laoust reports the presence of only one council. In theory this is composed of the notables or respondants (*amur*, *bab n umur*, *amasay* in Berber; *mezrag*, *reffad*, or *hamil* in Arabic) of each division, and is headed by a president or chief (*amghar n taqbilt*) elected annually by the noble families of the *ksar*. In practice, however, the same individual may become chief year after year, and he may even select the respondants from each division. The chief also appoints an assistant (*amghar ellemezrae*) each year from among the divisions, who acts as a controller or police-chief over the respondants and is therefore morphologically equivalent to the *amghar n l'amt* in Nesrat (La Chapelle, 1929, p. 32; Laoust, 1934, pp. 143-144).

Among all Berber groups the less important councils customarily hold their meetings in the local mosque. District and tribal councils commonly meet at district or tribal market places.

b. *Function*

Among the traditional Berbers the function of each representative council is to deal with those matters which interest it as a whole and concern only its members. Within this sphere it exercises what are commonly referred to in Western political thought as executive,

4: Hoffman E-4 (no date) 1967 MW11 Shluh MW11 (ca. 1900)

623 635 634 legislative, and judicial functions. The council concerns itself with the maintainance of internal equilibrium between individuals by dispensing and enforcing the customary law, modifying it if necessary; maintains relations with outside groups, and conducts wars against them; administers the communal institutions (mosque, saints' tombs, mosque school, communal granary and cemetery, and irrigation system); distributes water according to the local pattern of water rights; administers and distributes communal lands both for purposes of agriculture and grazing; fixes the schedule for agricultural operations or nomadic or transhumant migration; and in some cases also manages the local market (Coon, 1931, pp. 96-109, 112-114; Deverdun, 1942, p. 307; Doutté, 1905; Hart, 1954, pp. 65-66; La Chapelle, 1929, pp. 32-33; Laoust, 1934, pp. 140-146; Loubignac, 1942, pp. 280-281; Paniagua y Santos, 1948, pp. 14-15).

The *jemaa* generally carries out its functions by appointing or electing executors of various sorts and delegating power and authority to these individuals. The most important of these is the president of the council itself, known as an *amghar* or *sheikh* if head of a district or tribal council, and otherwise as a *moqaddem*. Other functionaries include the administrator of communal labor (particularly on irrigation projects), the administrator or distributor of water, the communal policeman, the religious teacher, and specialists in the administration of customary law (known as *anezzarfou*, pl., *inezzourfa*), though the council reserves the power to revise and modify this legal code (Berque, 1955, pp. 107, 112; Hart, 1954, p. 65; Loubignac, 1942, pp. 280-281; Paniagua y Santos, 1948, p. 14).

671 c. *Customary Law*

Traditionally, all disputes among the Berbers, both of a civil or criminal nature, were settled through reference to traditional customary law (*azrif*), which was largely uncodified and showed slight variations from tribe to tribe. Although replaced among the plains populations by the Moslem *Shari'a*, Berber customary law is still functional in civil cases throughout the Middle and High Atlas (1957), partly through French intervention on its behalf (Coudino, 1942, p. 431; Johns Hopkins University, 1956, pp. 230-231).

The local and communal aspects of the *azrif* are known variously

4: Hoffman E-4 (no date) 1967 MW11 Shluh MW11 (ca. 1900)

Shooting at a man but missing him,
Collection of blood money,
Failure to attend weddings outside the commune,
Speaking to women in market.

Tribal Council

Adultery caught in the act,
Wounding,
Murder.

681 The nature of the crime also determines the fine imposed. All [685] *'urfs* on record are for the most part long lists of fines for infractions [623] of various rules. If the crime is theft, the fine also varies according [634] to the value of the object stolen. These fines are generally paid to [6] the *jemaa* having jurisdiction over the case. Thus, in Nesrat the [191] fine paid by the respondant of a division of the *ksar* to the *amghar n l'amt* accrues to the members of the superior council (Johns Hopkins University, 1956, p. 232; La Chapelle, 1929, pp. 32-33).

682 This system of jurisprudence, while functioning satisfactorily in most cases, often broke down when the crime was homicide, either because the initial act caused such immediate reprisal and developed into a war so quickly that the councillors found themselves fighting on one side or another before they could call a meeting, or because the tribal council lacked the power to enforce its decision. This 692 situation was forestalled somewhat among some of the Shluh tribes through the institution of annual "rounds of justice".

... Lorsque les cantons [districts] sont ainsi groupés de manière à constituer une véritable tribu, formée d'un certain nombre de petites unités autonomes, on procède souvent à des tournées de justice exécutées dans tout le territoire, au cours desquelles toutes les infractions commises pendant l'année sont examinées et punies. Toutes les forces de la tribu viennent alors prêter leur appui à chacun des cantons pour faciliter le règlement rapide des différends sans qu'il en résulte aucun danger pour la paix intérieure.

Cette coutume, naguère observée chez les Igezzoulen de l'Anti-Atlas occidental, est encore très vivante dans la confédération des Ida Ou Tanan, chez les Ait Ou'azzoun [545] et les Ifesfasen [544]. La tournée de justice est accomplie en suivant un cérémonial minutieusement observé. Chez les Aït Ou'azzoun, par exemple, tribu formée de quinze "afous" ou

4: Hoffman E-4 (no date) 1967 MW11 Shluh MW11 (ca. 1900)

000 women. In this way there are generally two sides fighting each other before the day is over, and they stay there and fight until one side has won. If the tribal council wins and succeeds in burning the house of the murderer, it burns the rest of the houses of the *bone* as well, and cuts down as many of its trees as it desires.

The *bone* then flees in a body to another fifth, to another tribe, or out of the Rif entirely. If the members, thinking already of vengeance, cannot stand the sight of their trees being cut down and their houses caved in, they select a bull from the herd which they are driving into exile with them and entrust it to the leader of the mosque or to a student, who leads it back into the presence of the tribal council and slaughters it there [thereby "casting" an *'ar* upon them]. If this is done the tribal council is compelled to let them go back again and to permit them to pay the fine. Once the bull is slaughtered the tree-cutting and other destruction must cease. Many *bones* are too proud either to pay or to send a bull, so that they become destitute and homeless through their pride, providing they are not strong enough to defend themselves against the tribal council... (Coon, 1931, pp. 104-105).

628 As a result of these attitudes and institutions, vendetta warfare was the normal state of existence throughout much of the Berber highlands before the French Protectorate (Loubignac, 1942, p. 286).

d. *Council Presidents or "Chiefs"*

623 As indicated above, almost all representative councils have
554 presiding officers known variously as *moqaddemin* (pl. of *moqaddem*),
634 *imgharin* (pl. of *amghar*), or *shiukh* (pl. of *sheikh*). In the traditional
635 Berber republic this individual was only *primus inter pares*; he executed the wishes of the council, and he depended largely upon his personal qualities of moderation, persuasion, intelligence, and good luck. If he attempted to abuse his power the council punished
[687] him by a heavy fine, by burning his house or tent, or even putting
634 him to death. Despite the threat of these sanctions, the tribal or
635 district *jemaa* usually had to watch its president most carefully lest
554 he usurp power or establish himself permanently (Doutté, 1905; Montagne, 1930, pp. 224-225).

The powers and functions of the council president throughout most of the Berber country have been well described by Loubignac, who we will here follow closely. Of the various council presidents the most important were those of the independent district (among

4: Hoffman E-4 (no date) 1967 MW11 Shluh MW11 (ca. 1900)

the southern Shluh groups) or of the tribe. These higher officials customarily carried the title of *amghar* (a Berber word derived from the root *mqour*, signifying "to be great or important") and of *sheikh* – these titles also appearing in such combination as *amghar n'tuga* ("chief of the grass"), *sheikh er rbi'a* ("chief of the spring, grass[?]"), and *sheikh el 'am* ("chief of the year"). In most cases these chiefs held office for only one year, though in some cases they could be reelected for a second term. Among the Ait Outferkal (605), however, the term of office corresponded in years to the number of divisions in the district responsible for appointing the tribal chief. More recently each district of this tribe has had a separate chief appointed for life – this is also the situation in many of the sub-Saharan regions explored by Foucauld. Among most Berber groups it was customary for the district or tribal president to remain in office for longer than a year if a war developed during his term of office, and if he proved himself to be a capable leader. Only in time of war did he have any real power (Loubignac, 1942, pp. 281-282).

To be eligible for the post of tribal chieftain an individual generally had to be a native of the tribe, although long residence therein (40 years or so) sometimes could substitute for this requirement. The applicant also had to have experience in high public office; this and the previous requirements limited the circle of candidates to include only the tribal notables. The actual selection of the tribal *amghar* was almost always the prerogative of the *jemaa* – the only exceptions being among the Ait Mehammed (606), in the area of Azilal, and at Boudenig (in the area of the Ait Izdeg du Guir [438]), where the tribes have delegated the responsibility of choosing their leaders to holy men. Here and elsewhere, the selection is customarily made in the spring. Among the Ait Ichkern (416), for example, the incumbent *amghar* at this time notifies a conference of notables known as *asifed* ("return of powers") that his term is about to expire, and calls the tribe together for the ceremony known as the *taalamt*, for which he fixes the date. At the appropriate time delegations from all the divisions of the tribe assemble at the designated site with their tents, horses, and servants, accompanied *en masse* by the tribes-people. The preliminary festivities,

4: Hoffman E-4 (no date) 1967 MW11 Shluh MW11 (ca. 1900)

635 666 527 lasting for four days, are marked by various forms of entertainment, with banquets playing a leading role. Only after the conclusion of the festivities does the tribal council turn to the task of selecting the new tribal leader (Loubignac, 1942, p. 282).

635 666 [643] To ensure strict equality between the various divisions of the tribe each is called upon in turn to designate a member as a candidate for tribal chief – while if the office is that of supreme chief over the many tribes of a single confederation (this chief being appointed sometimes in time of war) those divisions having the privilege of making nominations are selected by lot. Once elected the appointee is theoretically prevented from rejecting the proferred honor by a sense of moral obligation – a sense reinforced in some tribes by the threat of sanctions. Nevertheless, there is in practice always some resistance to the appointment, for the office carries with it great responsibility and heavy expenses (Loubignac, 1942, p. 283).

635 631 After his succession to office the new *amghar* carries out two measures which are indispensable for the effective exercise of his authority. First, he appoints from among the notables of each division one who is to act as the "respondant" or "guarantor" for that division – this respondant being responsible for the conduct of the members of the division, for the execution of orders given by the [621] *amghar*, and for the application of sanctions if necessary. The res- [613] pondant of each division or fraction in turn designates repondants in every commune over which he has jurisdiction, and these commune respondants in turn designate respondants for each village or [182] minor lineage. This system of command and of delegation of authority assures the execution of orders given by the *amghar*, but also acts to promote the autonomy of the smaller social units, for the minor respondants and council members take care of all local problems in their own way without interference from the tribal *amghar*. The second step carried through by the *amghar* is to revise and enlarge the schedule of fines so as to encourage obedience to his promulgations (Johns Hopkins University, 1956, p. 227; Loubignac, 1942, p. 283).

635 554 In the traditional democratic Berber republic the duties of the *amghar* are often poorly defined, for they often duplicate those still

4: Hoffman E-4 (no date) 1967 MW11 Shluh MW11 (ca. 1900)

retained by the *jemaa*, for this body is often reluctant to delegate completely its authority and functions. In theory, and generally in practice, however, the *amghar* represents the tribe in its dealings with neighbouring and foreign social units; protects the interests of the community and the customs and laws of each unit; executes the decisions of the *jemaa*; proposes measures of general communal interest and certain public utilitarian projects, such as irrigation works; oversees the seasonal migrations, or establishes the schedule for planting and harvest; fixes the contribution to be made by each group in money or goods for the maintenance of the public works; acts as administrator of the tribal treasury if there is one (this is particularly the case among the *ksar* of southern Morocco); and, finally, being responsible for public order and safety, supports the police and applies the schedule of fines (Johns Hopkins University, 1956, pp. 228-229; Loubignac, 1942, p. 283).

The powers of the *amghar* are somewhat more extensive in the military sphere, particularly in time of war. He has the authority to compel each division to buy a certain number of horses and guns; together with the tribal *jemaa* he determines the size of the contingent to be furnished by each group and the supplies to be carried, as well as the place of combat and, in case of success, the division of spoils (Johns Hopkins University, 1956, p. 229; Loubignac, 1942, pp. 283-284).

The fluid and often vague separation of powers and responsibilities between the *jemaa* and the *amghar* acts, as may be expected, as a severe restraint upon initiative in leadership.

... La confusion des pouvoirs était grande; l'assemblée des notables, qui les détenait tous, n'abdiquait pas volontiers entre les mains d'un seul; égalitaire à l'excès, elle se montrait résolument hostile à toute tentative de pouvoir personnel; aussi contrôlait-elle avec méfiance les initiatives de l'Amrhar, de sorte qu'il n'osait rien entreprendre sans la consulter; l'autorité de chef était discutée dès qu'elle voulait s'affirmer; elle dépendait moins de son titre que de sa situation personnelle, de son prestige, de la fermeté de son caractère, de la puissance de ses proches, de la crainte qu'il savait à l'occasion inspirer; la situation de ses répondants, ses représentants dans les fractions, était encore moins assise. Dans cette confusion, chacun s'occupait de tout, et le nombre des interlocuteurs obscurcissait encore le débat. Pour éviter des froissements qui auraient entraîné de graves incidents, on s'efforçait de réaliser l'unani-

4: Hoffman E-4 (no date) 1967 MW11 Shluh MW11 (ca. 1900)

mité sur des solutions qui, en cherchant à ménager tous les intérêts, risquaient souvent de ne satisfaire personne (Loubignac, 1942, p. 284).

635 631 669 175 This conflict between the tribal chief and the tribal council, which in the pre-Protectorate period generally resulted in victory for the representative council among the Beraber, Riffians, and Shluh of the Anti-Atlas, was resolved in favor of the chiefs among the Shluh of the western High Atlas. Here, a number of chiefs, taking advantage of the general state of inter-tribal warfare existing around 1893, seized absolute power within their tribes and, with the help of arms smuggled in from the coast, extended the areas of their control and established quasi-feudal caidates. The most important of these existed in the High Atlas between Safi and Mogador on the coast, to the Dades-Dra region, and included the caidates of the Abdas (headed by Si Aissa Ben Omar), of the Hahas (Anflous), the M'Tougas (Si Abd el Malek), the Goundafas (Si Tayeb Goundafi), the Glaouas (Si Madani Glaoui, and later his brother Haji Thami Glaoui), and the Ahensals (Sidi Moh Hansali) (Great Britain, 1919, pp. 157-161; La Chapelle, 1928; Montagne, 1928; 1930, pp. 269-364, 395-400; 1949, pp. 116-117).

The principalities established by these conquering *imgharin* were generally organized after the pattern established by the *Makhzen*, and somewhat resembled small independent feudal states in medieval Europe. Each *amghar* or *caid* nominally acknowledged the Sultan as temporal ruler, but actually remained independent. Each *caid* assumed the ultimate power and authority, as well as title to the land, by right of conquest. Each governed his domain through deputies, known as *khulafa'* (pl. of *khalifa*), who were usually, though not always, members of his family. Each *caid* and *khalifa* resided in a heavily fortified residence (actually a palace) known as a *kasbah* (pl. *kisab*), together with his household, men and women who tilled the land surrounding the castle for the owner's profit, masons, carpenter, a cobbler and a tailor, and the manager of a small food shop. In the literature on southern Morocco, the term *kasbah* is often erroneously applied to a *ksar*; such usage is only correct in the relatively infrequent case that a *ksar* contains a *kasbah* as at Ouarzazate (Landau, 1951, pp. 82-83).

4: Hoffman E-4 (no date) 1967 MW11 Shluh MW11
(ca. 1900)

1936, pp. 50-51; Westermarck, 1926, Vol. 1, pp. 564-567). 628

Among the transhumants *tagma* and *tada* alliances are employed first and foremost to control and regularize occupancy of pasture-lands – a function particularly important in those regions, such as the Middle Atlas, where each area, upon becoming vacated by the departure of one group, is immediately reoccupied by one coming up from the rear. In such a situation, the existence of the alliance enables the councils of the allied groups to designate lands of common pasturage, in which members of the two groups may graze their sheep successively or together. Only under such circumstances does grazing take place freely and without molestation. In fact, good relations between two groups occupying the same territory is inconceivable without the existence of a *tada* alliance, for this alliance not only opens the way for common use of the land, but also prohibits theft, adultery, or other injury (Bruno and Bousquet, 1946, pp. 366-368). 571 171

Leff alliances differ from *tada* alliances in involving many more groups and covering much larger areas; furthermore they characteristically involve the alignment of politically independent districts or tribes into two balanced and opposed units known as *leff* (pl. *lfuf*) in Arabic, as *ameqqon* (pl. *imeqqon*) in Tashilhait, and as *tafergant* in Tamazight. These units characteristically form a checkerboard or mosaic structure which may cut boldly across both tribal and confederation boundaries, allying, for example, districts of one tribe with districts in another and putting them into opposition with districts within their own tribe (see Fig. 7); they thus present a pattern in which each district or tribe is usually bordered by some of the same and some of the opposite *leff* unit. In areas where the *leff* structure was still strong in the pre-Protectorate period, such as among the Shluh and Beraber, and in the western Jebala, the *leff* units seem to have functioned primarily to provide mutual assistance in defensive war. Among the Shluh and the Riffians the units were characteristically permanent – dividing the population into traditional moieties; among the Beraber realignments were more common; among the Arabic-speakers the *leff* structures were characteristically unstable, and also demonstrated disintegration resulting from the natural antagonism of the *Makh-* 571 628 616 634 635 [171]

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 107

4: Hoffman E-4 (no date) 1967 MW11 Shluh MW11 (ca. 1900)

102
571
616
634
• 635



Fig. 7. The *Leff* Structure of Northern Morocco, Redrawn from Montagne (1930, map opp. p. 208).

4: Hoffman E-4 (no date) 1967 MW11 Shluh MW11 (ca. 1900)

zen to such a competitive political system (Adams, 1953, p. 33; Coon, 1931, pp. 105-108; Deverdun, 1942, pp. 306-307; Doutté, 1905; Montagne, 1930, pp. 182-216; Murdock, 1956, pp. 142-143; Spillmann, 1936, pp. 49-52; see also Berque, 1955, pp. 424-439, for a critique of the *leff* theory).

Just as the *tada* alliance between extended groups represents an extension of the *tagmat* or "brotherhood" alliance between individuals and families, so the *leff* alliance represents a still further extension of fictional brotherhood between extended groups. This is clearly illustrated among the Ait Atta (465-491), where the pact of *tafergant* ("interdiction"), renewed annually, is marked by a "ceremony of milk" symbolizing the fiction of a common mother, and involves a prohibition upon the men to marry, or even to "look" upon, the women of the opposite group. Among the Shluh the *leff* alliance is renewed or revitalized annually by great festivals and "rounds of hospitality" (*tinoubga*), in which the ties of brotherhood between the *leff* members are reemphasized, and in the course of which many private associations, family alliances, and marriages are also contracted (Berque, 1955, pp. 425-426; Montagne, 1930, pp. 187-191; Spillmann, 1936, pp. 50-51).

Among the Shluh of the High Atlas and Anti-Atlas the political importance of the *leff* units was very great in pre-Protectorate times, the balance of power between the two divisions usually acting as a strong restraint against agressive action. If a Shluh district was, in fact, attacked by another, the defenders despatched messengers to the border of their *leff* allies to fire gunshot signals, a few hours after which the forces of the victimized *leff* began to pour across the border to give battle to the aggressor. In such a case the *leff* allies of the aggressor generally did not also intervene, but if they did, as frequently happened in the Tiznit area, the outcome was a general war throughout the area of the *leff* structure (Montagne, 1930, pp. 187, 202-203).

c. *Intervention*

Although but a single *leff* structure existed in northern Morocco during the early 20th century, the importance of this system varied greatly within this region, being strongest in the western Jebala and